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According to the allegations of a federal indictment, in the fall of 2010 a guest user 
logged on to the MIT campus network and be-
gan systematically downloading articles from 
the JSTOR archive. This activity continued over 
the next few months. Both MIT and JSTOR 
noticed the unusual traffic (which allegedly 
caused some server overloading) and took 
steps to disable the automated access, but 
the user was able to restore the connection. 
Both Massachusetts state police and the 
FBI became involved in investigating the 
situation, and in January 2011, activist and 
programmer Aaron Swartz was detained by 
police on the MIT campus. 
At that time, Swartz was a research fel-
low at Harvard University’s Safra Center for 
Ethics, and, although only 24 years old, he 
has a long history of activism and advocacy 
on issues related to openness and sharing. 
As early as age 14, he was a member of an 
international working group that developed 
early specifications for the Web-content 
syndication protocol, RSS. He was an early 
employee of the social-news site Reddit. He 
worked on projects with Wikipedia and the 
Internet Archive, and founded the progres-
sive activist group DemandProgress. 
Swartz has been involved in similar in-
cidents of large-scale downloading in the 
past. In 2008, during a trial run of a program 
providing free public access terminals for 
the government’s Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER) system, he used 
an automated script to download millions 
of pages (approximately 20 percent of all 
the records in that system), and shared 
them with the public. PACER records are 
in the public domain, but Swartz’s activities 
resulted in the trial public-access program 
being put on hold, and attracted the atten-
tion of federal investigators. No charges ever 
resulted from that incident. 
In the present case, however, serious 
charges have resulted—charges carrying a 
potential prison term of up to 35 years and 
a fine of up to $1 million. While the public 
discussion around this case has focused 
on the articles Swartz allegedly copied, the 
charges have little to do with the download-
ing itself. They primarily relate to the actions 
Swartz took in order to have access to JSTOR 
through the MIT network—actions including 
online evasions of network management, 
and physical-world unauthorized access to 
areas of MIT buildings. The charges brought 
against Swartz for these actions are primarily 
wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) and computer 
fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1030). In several instances, 
the criminal charges are based specifically 
on the fact that Swartz violated MIT and JS-
TOR user policies—and in those instances, 
these charges raise some significant issues 
that the academic library community should 
be concerned about. 
This is a relatively new model of criminal 
liability, growing out of a piece of legisla-
tion from 1986 (the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act) that prohibits unauthorized 
access to computer networks. Starting in 
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the early 2000s, prosecutors in some cases 
began arguing that any access to a computer 
network in violation of its terms of use is 
“unauthorized” access, and can amount to 
federal computer fraud. This strategy has 
been hotly contested by legal scholars and 
many in the technology and Internet sectors, 
because under this theory, criminal liability 
can arise regardless of the actual terms in the 
terms of use, and without regard for whether 
they match up with any other commonly 
understood elements of criminal behavior. 
Under this theory, creating a Facebook or 
Google+ profile under a pseudonym (which 
is explicitly against the terms of service on 
each site) could serve as the basis for federal 
criminal charges. That may sound farfetched, 
except that one of the first cases using this 
theory of liability was about exactly that: the 
creation of a fake MySpace profile that was 
used to harass a young teen who eventu-
ally committed suicide. The harassment, 
though deplorable, was not sufficient to 
meet the definitions of any existing crime, 
so prosecutors argued for federal computer 
fraud liability for violation of the MySpace 
terms of service. 
The judge in that case refused to apply 
the new theory: he deplored the harassment, 
but said that interpreting any violation of 
terms of service as grounds for criminal lia-
bility would be “overwhelmingly overbroad” 
and constitutionally problematic. Neverthe-
less, the theory has been increasingly used 
by prosecutors when few other laws would 
directly enable prosecution, and a number 
of courts have accepted it. 
The constitutional and other troubling is-
sues raised by this novel and evolving theory 
of criminal liability are seriously problematic, 
but probably best handled by lawyers, law 
enforcement, legislators, and policymakers. 
However, there are specific issues about this 
theory’s application in Swartz’s case that 
should be of deep concern to the academic 
community: the terms of use that MIT cre-
ated for its own community, and the terms 
of use that JSTOR created and MIT accepted 
on behalf of its users are being used as the 
basis of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, 
the prosecution is proceeding when JSTOR 
and MIT seem to have chosen not to pursue 
civil litigation against Swartz. According to a 
public statement released by JSTOR shortly 
after news of the indictment became public, 
JSTOR had resolved their concerns with 
Swartz before the federal prosecution came 
into play. And although MIT has been less 
forthcoming about the case, it too seems to 
have chosen not to pursue civil litigation 
against Swartz. Despite this, the United States 
Attorney for the state of Massachusetts chose 
to prosecute Swartz. 
The U.S. Attorney’s office is well within 
its rights in choosing to prosecute despite a 
lack of action from potential civil litigants, 
which is known as “prosecutorial discretion.” 
In theory, we distinguish crimes from civil 
offenses because the former cause harms 
to society as a whole. Therefore, it is up to 
prosecutors in any criminal case to decide 
whether to bring charges against someone, 
regardless of the choices of the direct victims 
of the crime. Leaving aside the question of 
whether there was a societal harm here, and 
whether JSTOR and MIT were the “victims,” 
we should be very aware that the terms we 
impose on our own networks’ use, and the 
terms we agree to in contracts with vendors, 
may be able to serve as the basis of criminal 
charges against our users. This may happen 
even when we, and our vendors, might 
prefer to resolve any conflicts privately. It 
is, of course, unlikely that most library user 
activities will ever attract the attention of 
federal law enforcement, but when and if 
they do, the enforcement of our policies, 
and the licensing terms to which we have 
agreed, may be out of our hands. 
Many users of subscription resources do 
make uses of the systems that are question-
able in relation to the official terms of use. 
Often such questionable uses are ignored 
or tolerated by campus and vendor system 
administrators. One such use is computa-
tional analysis of the content in such data-
bases, most subscription resources prohibit 
mass-downloading for such purposes, but 
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some allow it when permission is sought 
separately. 
In the Swartz case, the prosecution al-
leges that Swartz intended to distribute the 
downloaded documents publicly. And al-
though the prosecution offers no evidence in 
support of this, some of Swartz’s own public 
statements suggest he could have had such an 
intent. But Swartz has also engaged recently 
in scholarly research projects doing compu-
tational analysis on article texts, and certainly 
could have intended only such a use for the 
materials he downloaded. JSTOR’s own Data 
for Research program is still in beta, and will 
likely evolve in response to the needs of re-
searchers who take advantage of the program. 
Is it possible that if MIT’s license with JSTOR 
had provided for research access to the corpus 
in a way that satisfied his specific research 
needs, Swartz would never even have begun 
his systematic downloading? 
Much of the discussion around this case 
highlights public misperceptions of libraries 
and of licensed content. Both Swartz’s sup-
porters and the prosecution have focused on 
Swartz’s copying of articles, despite the fact 
that the charges focus on fraud, not theft or 
copyright violations. His supporters ridiculed 
the prosecution by suggesting his alleged 
downloading was like checking “too many” 
books out of the library. The prosecution 
repeatedly made reference to Swartz’s ac-
tions as “stealing,” despite the fact that the 
charges they brought against Swartz focus 
on fraud. Most academic library employees 
could readily explain to Swartz’s supporters 
that subscription license terms are often more 
restrictive than the “First Sale” doctrine that 
enables library lending, and would probably 
also point out that most libraries do impose 
some limits on book borrowing. Similarly, li-
brary employees could explain to the prosecu-
tion that although Swartz may have acquired 
copies of millions of JSTOR documents, there 
was never any erasure or removal of content 
from JSTOR’s servers, so invoking the rhetoric 
of “theft” is a bit problematic.
The fact that both the prosecution and 
Swartz’s supporters can talk about the case 
with such superficial, and deeply incorrect, 
messages about libraries and licensed content, 
highlights the significant disparity between 
what our users understand our services to be, 
and what we agree to when we sign contracts 
for licensed resources. Most of our users 
honestly don’t understand that our contracts, 
rather than providing free and unlimited ac-
cess to licensed resources for all purposes, 
often provide access only up to usage limits 
implemented by vendors, and often provide 
access only for personal use. Perhaps this 
means that we need to negotiate license terms 
that are more in line with user expectations for 
our services; perhaps it means that we need 
to better educate our users about what access 
our contracts really provide. The former ap-
proach is an extremely tall order; the latter is 
unlikely to be very palatable to our users. It 
is, however, very clear that licensing terms, 
which govern an increasingly large proportion 
of our collections, are a fundamental issue 
in the present and future usability of library 
resources by our campus populations. 
Another strong thread in the public discus-
sion of this case has been a denunciation of 
restricted access to scholarship (and tangen-
tially, to public domain documents). Swartz’s 
2008 “Guerilla Open Access Manifesto” speaks 
out against “[t]he world’s entire scientific and 
cultural heritage, published over centuries 
in books and journals, [being] increasingly 
being digitized and locked up by a handful 
of private corporations.” Researchers and 
scholars commenting on the case speculated 
on whether many of the authors of the articles 
Swartz downloaded would have objected to 
his activities, and others deplored the “gate-
keeper” function that even nonprofit aggrega-
tors like JSTOR serve. 
One individual, Greg Maxwell, uploaded a 
collection of more than 18,000 public domain 
documents legally acquired from JSTOR to 
the file-sharing site The Pirate Bay, as a direct 
response to the indictment against Swartz. In 
a public statement attached to the document 
set, Maxwell said, “I’ve been afraid that if I 
published them I would be subject to unjust 
legal harassment by those who profit from 
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controlling access to these works. I now feel 
that I’ve been making the wrong decision.” 
There is a cost in maintaining access to 
these resources, and some commentators 
have expressed support for JSTOR’s non-
profit mission, but even among these sup-
porters, many suggested that public domain 
documents should be more freely available 
than in-copyright works. A number of com-
mentators criticized Swartz’s alleged actions 
while expressing support for the underlying 
idea that scholarship should be more open 
and free. 
Open society activist Carl Malamud, at 
whose suggestion Swartz conceived his 
earlier project scraping content from the 
public-domain PACER database, spoke in the 
New York Times of his own efforts to “force” 
open gates around content, but characterized 
Swartz’s alleged efforts as searching for a 
“back door” and questioned the effectiveness 
of such pursuits.1 Legal scholar and activist 
Larry Lessig, who has worked with Swartz 
for several years, made a statement in the 
comments at the “Media Freedom” blog that 
questioned whether the alleged activities 
truly constituted a crime, but affirmed that, if 
the allegations proved true, Swartz’s actions 
crossed an ethical line.2 
Swartz has pled not guilty to all charges, 
and was due back in court on September 
9, 2011. We may not know the status of the 
criminal prosecution for some time to come. 
Nonetheless his activities, and the public reac-
tions they have generated, highlight some of 
the most troubled, and troubling, legal and 
ethical issues in academic licensing, open 
access, and scholarly communication. What-
ever the outcome of the criminal prosecution, 
we must not ignore the importance of these 
issues for the academic and research library 
community.
Notes
1. www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/
us/20compute.html.
2. http://mediafreedom.org/2011/07/
larry-lessig-responds-says-swartzs-alleged-
actions-crossed-ethical-line/. 
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